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Credibility is one of the central issues in conducting monetary policy. It is necessary in 
order to anchor the economic agents’ expectation on the central bank’s inflation target.  A central 
bank which is  capable of managing the public’s expectation of inflation in a proper manner 
would able to implement monetary policy more effectively and efficiently. This paper attempts 
to assess the role of credibility in the implementation of the inflation targeting framework in 
Indonesia.  It  illustrates  how  credibility  may  play  an  important  role  in  the  evolution  of  the 
Indonesian monetary policy. Knowing the degree of credibility would be beneficial for Bank 
Indonesia (BI) in  understanding  how policy instruments can be adjusted  to achieve a long-term 
inflation target.   
 
A small open-economy model originally based on Global Projection Model (GPM) of the 
IMF (Carabenciov et.al, 2008), namely the Aggregate Rational Inflation-Targeting Model for 
Bank Indonesia (ARIMBI) is developed to analyse how monetary policy affects the economy 
and how an optimal policy should be designed. The model employs a New-Keynesian Phillips 
Curve  (NKPC),  an  expectation  IS  curve,  an  uncovered  interest  parity  (UIP)  equation  and  a 
monetary policy rule which are basically derived from the microfoundation of economic agents’ 
behaviours.  Hence,  the  model  is  able  to  generate  key  economic  variables  (inflation,  output, 
interest rate and exchange rate). In addition, we also study how credibility affects these dynamic 
variables by incorporating an ad-hoc credibility variable in two alternatives ways: exogen and 
endogen.  
 
For the initial value in the model, we need to measure the current value of the credibility 
index of Indonesian monetary policy. We follow Valentin & Rozalia (2008) and Cecchetti & 
Krause  (2002)  for  the  approaches.  Summing  up  the  previous  measurement  results  (such  as 
Harmanta  (2009)),  we  conclude  that  monetary  credibility  in  Indonesia  is  not  yet  perfectly 
credible or, in other words,there is imperfect credibility. On a scale ranging from zero (purely not 
credible) to one (perfect credibility), our quantitative measurements found that the credibility 
index for Indonesian monetary policy seems converge at around 0.5. 
 
Referring  to  the projection and simulation results in this paper, the study shows that the  
expectation inflation of economic agents is strongly influenced by monetary policy credibility. 
The more credible the monetary policy, the faster inflation expectation would anchor to its target. 
Consequently, it is also more likely that  actual inflation would anchor to the target. In turn, the 
operation of the disinflation process towards the  long-term target of  low-and-stable  inflation 6 
 
would accelerate. In addition to this effectiveness factor, high credibility is also beneficial in 
terms of the efficiency of the monetary policy transmission as disinflation cost (proxied  by the 
sacrifice  ratio)  would  also  decrease.  In  terms  of  the  two  alternative  ways  of  incorporating 
credibility, the result shows that the endogenous way is more realistic than the exogenous one. In 
addition, we found that under imperfect credibility, the central bank prefers to attain its inflation 
target gradually. Another interesting finding is that if the authority has twice the credibility stock, 
then  achieving  its  long-term  inflation  target  requires    only  much  shorter  time  periods 
(approximately 0.4 periods than the baseline). 
 
JEL Classification: E31, E52, E58, E61. 
Keywords: Disinflation, Monetary Policy, Imperfect Credibility, Sacrifice Ratio.   7 
 
1.   Introduction  
 
1.1   Background               
 
            The  Law  No.23 of  1999  mandates  Bank  Indonesia  (BI)  to  achieve  and  maintain  the 
stability of the Rupiah (single objective). Although it is not formally stated explicitly in the Act, 
the Inflation Targeting Framework (ITF) is currently BI’s monetary policy framework. The ITF 
is characterised by the setting of an inflation target, announced to the public, and pursuance of 
this  target  as the  primary  goal  of  monetary  policy.  Implementation  of  the  ITF  in  Indonesia 
emphasises the importance of controlling inflation anchored to the target as it is a necessary 
condition for improving overall social welfare. Numerically, low and stable long-term inflation 
of 3% is the common figure to represent competitiveness with other countries. 
 
The ITF could be taken as a framework for a forward-looking monetary policy, focusing 
on inflation, and inflation expectations of economic agents. According to Mishkin (2000), the 
important  features  of  the  ITF  are  commitment  to  pursuing  inflation  as  a  primary  goal  of 
monetary policy, announcement of the  inflation target (including monetary policy measures), 
and accountability. Some advantages of the ITF are that there is a clear inflation target, it is 
easily observable and the monetary policy measures easily understood. The framework would 
provide  a  nominal  anchor  of  economic  agents  in  forming  inflation  expectations  and  predict 
monetary policy actions. However, formulating  an inflation target as a nominal anchor requires 
credible monetary policy.   
 
             The most critical  point where monetary policy could affect inflation is when the leading 
inflation expectations of economic agents are able to be anchored to the central bank's inflation 
target. There is general agreement that inflation expectations of economic agents is an important 
variable in implementing monetary policy. If economic agents' expectations remain high, the 
disinflation process would last longer and require greater cost (loss of output) (Clarida, Gali and 
Gertler, 1999). A central bank which is able to manage inflation expectations would be able to 
conduct  effective  monetary  policy  and,  thus,  monetary  policy  could  be  said  to  be  credible 
(Blinder, 1999). 
 
      Some studies indicated that the monetary policy credibility problem may arise due to 
the uncertainties of economic agents about the preferences of monetary authorities. Although the 
monetary authorities announce an inflation target, it may not be fully credible if the inclinations 
of central banks toward inflation reduction is not too convincing (Geraats, 2001; Kozicki and 
Tinsley,  2003).  Economic  agents  try  to  interpret  preferences  based  on  the  monetary  policy 
actions of monetary authorities and performance of inflation which then  further feedback on 
their expectations. King (1996) stressed that transparency would encourage the learning process 
so that the inflation expectations of economic agents would be anchored  to the inflation target 
more quickly. 
 
             There has been significant attention associated with the disinflation strategy in achieving 
low and stable inflation, namely: (i) the cost of disinflation, in relation to the trade-off of output - 
inflation  (output  loss),  and  (ii)  the  length  of  disinflation.  Numerous  studies  show  that  the 
disinflation  strategy  is  highly  influenced  by  the  credibility  of  monetary  policy.  Within  the 8 
 
framework of the ITF, if monetary policy is not fully credible (imperfect credibility), the learning 
process of economic agents will be very slow as the economic agents do not fully believe that  
monetary policy  can  attain the  inflation target. This,  in turn, would affect the formation of 
inflation  expectations  and  the  actual  inflation  would  subsequently  converge  slowly  to  the 
inflation target, putting a  damper on policy rates and other macro variables (GDP, exchange 
rate, etc).  
 
1.2   Objective and Benefit  
     
           In order to answer several questions related to the impact of monetary policy credibility 
on the dynamics of the main macroeconomic variables, particularly in the achievement of the 
inflation target, the study aims to develop a model, namely the Aggregate Rational Inflation-
Targeting  Model  for Bank Indonesia (ARIMBI), which  is endowed with credibility  features. 
Specifically, the research objectives include: 
 
•  measuring the degree of monetary policy credibility in Indonesia;  
•  studying  the  dynamics  of  the  credibility  of  monetary  policy  in  Indonesia  and  its 
impact  on  the  dynamics  of  the  key  macroeconomic  variables  (inflation,  GDP, 
exchange rates, interest policy rates); and, 
•  conducting simulations to gauge the  size of the cost of disinflation and the speed of 
the process of disinflation that is translated to the inflation target over the medium 
term  and  long  term  according  to  varying  degrees  of  monetary  policy  credibility 
knowledge in Indonesia.  
 
           By adding the credibility feature into the model, the ARIMBI is expected to  generate an 
optimal trajectory of the main macroeconomic variables, namely GDP, inflation, interest rates 
and exchange rates. Furthermore, the ARIMBI with Imperfect Credibility could be utilised for 
simulation and forecasting of monetary policy to support achieving low and stable inflation with 
minimum output loss based on knowledge about its credibility. 
 
1.3   Scope of Research    
 
            The ARIMBI with Imperfect Credibility is used to conduct simulations and projections of 
economic policy by adding features of monetary policy credibility. There are two ways to add 
such  features,  mainly  the  exogenous  and  endogenous  methods.  The  degree  of  credibility  is 
measured by considering the extent to which the inflation targeting monetary authority is trusted 
by economic agents in forming inflation expectations. The smaller the deviation between the 
inflation  expectations  of  economic  agents  and  its  target  inflation,  the  higher  is  the  policy 
credibility. The ARIMBI model is developed using the IRIS toolbox in Matlab environment for 
programming, parameter estimation, managing data and conducting simulations and forecasting. 
 
1.4    Paper Organisation  
 
          Section 1 introduces and outlines the background of development models, objective and 
benefit,  and  research  limitation.  The  theoretical  review  in  Section  2  discusses  the 
macroeconomic  models,  stylised  facts  of  the  Indonesian  economy  in  recent  years,  and  the 9 
 
credibility of monetary policy. Section 3 explains the methodology and model, describing the 
model  structure  and transmission  mechanism  with  imperfect  credibility  and  equations  in  the 
model. Section 4 presents the results and analysis, specifically the results of simulations and 
projections using this model, particularly related to the costs and periods of disinflation process. 
Lastly, Section 5 presents the conclusions and policy implications. In addition, some potential 
improvements in model development are also discussed. 
  
2.   Theoretical Review  
 
2.1   Model Review        
 
            In general, the structure of macroeconomic models are built with the aim of capturing the 
reality of the workings of an economy as reflected from the interactive relationships of various 
economic  variables.  Basically  there  are  two  main  objectives  of  macroeconomic  modeling, 
namely:  (i)  preparing  economic  projections  (economic  projection),  and  (ii)  policy  impact 
analysis (policy simulation). With reference to the various central banks which  employ the ITF, 
a  reliable  macroeconomic  model  must  fulfill  several  characteristics:  (i)  it    reflects  the 
characteristics of the economic structure and is able to produce a comprehensive analysis of the 
main  determinants  of  inflation;  (ii)  represents  the  workings  of  monetary  policy  transmission 
mechanism; (iii) equipped with a policy rule, inference of the interest rate, Taylor’s rule, and sets 
the inflation target and an explicit expectation formation mechanism therein; (iv) consistent with 
its underlying theory (theoretically consistent); and (v) has a well-defined steady state which 
could produce projections/analysis that are consistent with theory. 
  
          Macroeconomic  modeling  that  is  directed  is  generally  characterised  by  short-term 
projections and utilises  a lot of historical data (time series) incorporating the use of econometric 
methods. It is plausible for econometric models to produce short-term forecasting of economic 
variables, but the estimated relationship between the variables is usually less well defined when 
used as a benchmark to evaluate a policy (policy simulation). While policy simulation is usually 
more of medium and long term, its high theoretical orientation and ability to explain real world 
phenomena can be validated by historical data. One economic model used for policy simulation 
that is built on microeconomic foundations on the general principle of equilibrium, and operated 
by entering a stochastic shock is often known as the Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium 
(DSGE). 
  
          In practice, there is usually a trade-off between the accuracy of projection resulting from 
the econometric  model and the  medium-  and  long-term policy  simulation obtained  from the 
DSGE  model.  Projections  generated  from  econometric  models  and  their  directions  do  not 
necessarily commensurate with the simulation results stemming from the DSGE model. Short-
term projections  based on acceptable goodness  of  fit  in the econometric  model,  may  not be  
necessarily aligned with the simulation results of the DSGE model. Based on the trade-offs since 
2008, BI has started to develop a model that combines the advantages of econometric models 
(adopting  Bayesian  Econometric  estimation  method)  and  DSGE  (New  Keynesian 
macroeconomic model) for projections and policy simulations. 
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            The  ARIMBI  with  Imperfect  Credibility  can  be  classified  as  a  semi-structural  model 
which is derived from a simple DSGE model. The equation used in the model is on an ad-hoc 
basis, in the sense that it is not  purely derived from standard equations as in the DSGE model. 
This provides flexibility in the development of the model as the emphasis of this study is policy-
oriented. 
 
2.2   Inflation Behavior and Expectation in Indonesia  
  
           In  the  last  two  decades,  Indonesian  inflation  was  in  the  high  single-digit  level.  By 
removing the crisis period, the average inflation is around 8.5% with a relatively high  level of 
volatility (standard deviation). After eliminating the effect of structural shocks (shocks), inflation 
in Indonesia still registers 7.9%. However, core inflation tends to decline relative to the average, 
by more than 7.4% after the implementation of the ITF (Table 2.1). If there are no surprises from 
the supply and demand sides, inflation would then trend towards the  level of the core inflation. 
Indonesian inflation is relatively high compared to other ASEAN countries (Thailand, Malaysia, 
Singapore or the Philippines), see Chart 2.1. 
 
Table 2.1  
Inflation Disagregation in Indonesia 
Period  CPI  Core CPI  VF  Adm  CPI Std. Deviation 
Pre Crisis ( 1992.01 - 1997.12  8.08  8.5  9.13  6.91  1.92 
Pre ITF (2000.01 - 2005.06)  7.94  7.69  4.47  14.96  4.34 
Post ITF (2005.07 - 2009.08)  9.75  7.41  14.18  13.33  4.35 










The phenomenon of high inflation which remains despite eliminating the shocks, led to 
the hypothesis of inflation persistence. If persistence is defined as the time required to return to 
the original level after the occurrence of shocks, then the above facts have implications for the 
persistence  of  high  inflation  in  Indonesia.  Several  studies  have  been  done  to  confirm  this 
(Alamsyah,  2008).  The  persistence  of  CPI  inflation,  disaggregated  by  groups  of  goods  and 
services, is around 0.8 to 0.9, although there is a general decreasing trend between the periods 
before and after the Asian Crisis (1997)
2. Decline in the degree of inflation persistence is also 
consistent with research by Yanuarti (2007). 
 
Furthermore, the high persistence of inflation in Indonesia was influenced by inflation 
expectations
3. Some studies in Indonesia in recent years also demonstrated the importance of 
inflation expectations on inflation forming
4. Therefore, inflation expectations must be considered 
in formulating monetary policy in order to achieve the inflation target.        
 
Chart 2.2  






    In the transition period and the implementation of ITF since 2000-2009, the actual 
inflation rate is more often out of the target range. This was mainly due to large shocks in the 
domestic economy, both in terms of food supply and distribution (volatile food) and pricing 
policies set by the government (administered prices). Unfortunately, core inflation is also often 
higher than the CPI inflation target. 
 
 
                                                              
2 Estimation of the persistence was completed by employing an autoregressive univariate model. By adopting the 
formula of Gujarati (2003) contained in the Alamsyah (2008), the persistence of inflation from 0.8 to 0.9 means that 
if there is a surprise, then 50% of those surprises would be absorbed within a period of 4-9 months and the rest 
would be absorbed as inflation trip back to the normal average length of term. Long computation time required to 
absorb 50% shocks using a formula calculating the mean lag ρ/ (1-ρ), with ρ is the degree of persistence.  
3 Hutabarat (2005) also found that inflation expectations of economic agents in the period 1999-2004 was dominated 
by inflation formation rather than the output gap, administered prices, supply shocks, and exchange rates. 
4 A study by Chatib Basri, Damayanti and Sutisna (2002) from LPEM - UI indicates that the major sources of 
Indonesian inflation are expected inflation, followed by exchange rate depreciation and money supply. 
CPI  CPI 
Expectation  Expectation  Trading Partner 12 
 
Chart 2.3 






Besides the problems mentioned above, the high inflation in Indonesia is also impacted 
by external influences, including the exchange rate pass-through effect and world commodity 
prices.  Additionally,  the  inevitable  fact  is  that  phenomenon  shocks  that  spread  through  the 
follow-up  expectations  would  in  turn  affect  core  inflation.   
Examples are inflationary pressures in 2005 and 2008, originating from external shocks coming 
from  the  increases  in  global  commodity  prices  of  both  energy  and  food  commodities.  The 
increase in world oil prices has prompted the government to raise fuel prices by an average of  
28.7%. In addition to having a direct impact on inflation, the influence of this second-round 
effect would also contribute to elevate the inflation rate. In general, for almost a decade, the 
deviation between actual inflation and the target has been due to good fundamentals as well as 
non-fundamental shocks closely associated with supply-side management. Given that  monetary 
policy tools are more suited to solving the problems on the demand side, supply-side problems 
require coordination between institutions, including Bank Indonesia and the government and its 
related agencies. 
  
           With  the  above  mentioned  facts,  the  task  of  bringing  about  a  decline  in  inflation 
(disinflation) is not an easy one. The characteristics of persistent inflation would naturally imply 
a slow process of disinflation. One study (Alamsyah, 2008) shows that persistence is caused 
primarily  by  the  formation  of  inflation  expectations  which  are  mostly  backward  looking  in 
manner. This occurrence is attributable  to the  fairly large proportion of  producers  who do not  
 




adjust their prices and maintain prices on previous expectations
5. The Survey of Price Formation 
Mechanism (in 2000 and 2003) confirms the relative reluctance of price changes at the producer 
level. The Survey indicates that prices are less flexible and companies rarely make changes in 
their price (only 1-2 times a year). 
 
This backward-looking occurrence in forming inflation expectation is also indicated in 
other regular surveys, both in metric (stating level) and non-metric (only direction) terms. BI’s 
inflation  expectation  surveys  cover  a  range  of  respondents:  consumer  level  (Survey  of 
Consumer-BI),  traders  (Retail  Sales  Survey-BI),  enterprises  (Business  Survey-BI)  and 
economists  (Market  Perception  Survey-BI  and  Consensus  Forecast  (CF).  In  general,  these 
surveys confirm a correlation between expectation and the lag actual inflation. For example, in 
CF, inflation expectations move in line with actual inflation. In addition, the backward-looking 
phenomenon is also demonstrated through empirical observations where the average of the last 
six  months  of  actual  inflation  has  a  significant  explanatory  power  on  inflation  expectations 
(Bank Indonesia, 2008).    
 
Nonetheless, forward-looking occurrence is also indicated, albeit for only a very short 
term. This is partly visible from inflation expectations on Survey of Consumer for a three month 
period which  has a high correlation with actual inflation at t +1 and t +2. Regression testing with 
the inclusion of other macroeconomic variables also shows that inflation expectations for three 
months in the Survey of Consumer has explanatory power of “ahead” core inflation projection in 
the very short term of 2-3 months. This indicates that inflation expectations from surveys have 
been able to act as an indicator of inflationary pressure albeit for the very short term.   
 
 In general, though backward-looking behaviour is quite dominant in inflation formation 
in Indonesia, this tended to decline  in the aftermath of the Asian Crisis (1997). Conversely, 
Alamsyah (2008) found that forward-looking behaviour tends to increase in the period after the 
crisis. As backward-looking behavior is declining, the degree of inflation persistence seems to be 
also declining. From the perspective of  commodity groups,  the decline in inflation persistence 
is occurring mainly in clothing goods and imported goods due to the increasingly competitive 
market structure. Hence, decreasing the degree of inflation persistence would bolster the growing 
role of monetary policy to control inflation. 
  
2.3   Inflation Persistence, Credibility Issue, and Disinflation Process    
  
2.3.1   Inflation Persistence and Policy Credibility    
 
The persistence of inflation in the midst of current economic conditions with pressures 
from external and domestic sources makes disinflation efforts towards low and stable inflation in 
the medium to long term very  challenging. It should be noted also that the central banks’ ability 
                                                              
5 In the formation of inflation within the framework of the NKPC equation (the New Keynesian Phillips Curve), it is 
assumed that the firm faces a monopolistic competition market structure so that there are companies that could 
determine the price (price setting) because it has little monopoly power. However, most companies still keep its 
price by indexation to a price before (backward looking). With this assumption, we would get the hybrid NKPC, in 
which inflation expectations would be influenced by backward looking and forward looking and the output gap (as a 
proxy of marginal cost). 14 
 
to control inflation is only limited to core inflation and not overall CPI inflation. Core inflation is 
influenced by fundamental factors such as the output gap, exchange rates, particularly prices of 
imported  goods  (imported  inflation),  and  inflation  expectations.  Other  components,  such  as 
volatile food and administered prices which are part of the CPI inflation rate, are not in the 
central bank’s domain of influence. Thus, a low and stable inflation rate cannot be achieved 
solely through the monetary policy of Bank Indonesia, but is also determined by fiscal and other 
economic policies pursued by the government. In addition to reducing the exchange rate pass-
through effect into inflation, it is necessary to also support policies to prevent exchange rate from 
being too volatile. 
  
            As noted earlier, the influence of core inflation on CPI inflation is more  dominant than 
volatile food and administered prices. Meanwhile, core inflation is more affected by inflation 
expectations of the community compared to the output gap and exchange rates. To this end, the 
inflation  target  and  monetary  policy  measures  and  monetary  instruments  used  to  achieve  it 
should  be  communicated  effectively  to  the  public  in  order  to  influence  and  shape  inflation 
expectations. 
 
             Hence, the credibility of monetary policy is essential for achieving a central bank’s goal 
of low and stable inflation. If economic agents are convinced that monetary policy would be 
capable  or  credible  in  achieving  the  inflation  target,  the  inflation  expectations  of  economic 
agents would be anchored to the inflation target leading to the actual inflation being anchored to 
the inflation target as well. This would further reduce inflation persistence. With a more credible 
monetary policy, the adjustment process of economic agents of anchoring inflation expectations 
to the target would be quick, and vice versa. As a common indicator, the deviation between 




           Due to the high persistence of inflation, a rapid process of disinflation would be very 
expensive as it requires tight interest rates which could cause a huge output loss. Consequently, 
to achieve the objectives of monetary policy and minimise the loss of social welfare,  monetary 
authorities  tend  to  implement  gradual  disinflation.  If  the  decline  in  actual  inflation  is  not 
significant, then inflation expectations of economic agents would adjust only marginally to the 
inflation target. Moreover, economic agents would rely on backward-looking behavior which 
increases the persistence of inflation.  
  
          From observation, it can be garnered that the credibility of monetary policy in Indonesia is 
relatively low, contributing to the persistence of high inflation (Harmanta, 2009). However, with  
the implementation of the ITF, the credibility of monetary policy has improved. This is reflected  
                                                              
6 Erceg and Levin (2003) show that the low credibility of monetary policy  of the US in 1980-1985 led to the 
persistence of high inflation and high cost (sacrifice ratio). An important implication of these findings is that the 
persistence of inflation is not an inherent characteristic of an economy but diversity associated with the credibility of 
monetary policy. It is shown that the persistence of inflation would be lower if monetary policy is credible, and 
otherwise create a high persistence of inflation when monetary policy is not fully credible (imperfect credibility) 
because economic agents have not fully believe in the inflation target in the future (forward looking). 15 
 
by  the  increase  of  the  Kalman  Gain
7  parameter  from  around  0.2  during  the  period  before 
implementation  of  the  ITF  (July  2005)  to  approximately  0.4  in  the  period  after  ITF 
implementation. It may be argued that with increased credibility of monetary policy after the 
ITF, inflation tends to be more influenced by the behavior of forward-looking economic agents. 
As a consequence, declining inflation persistence would guide inflationary expectations towards 
the target due to deliberate policies of the monetary authority
8. 
 
This is consistent with the observation of Orphanides and Williams (2007). Their study 
indicates that the formation of inflation expectations by focusing on the target inflation as the 
main goal of monetary policy in the era of ITF would facilitate the learning process of economic 
agents  better  than  the  non-ITF  era  with  multiple  objectives.  This  process  would  cause  the 
inflation expectations of economic agents to be more forward looking and be anchored to the 
inflation target. The results  are also consistent with Siregar and  Goo (2008) who show that 
inflation inertia in Indonesia has decreased for both non-tradable goods and tradable goods in the 
period of implementation of the ITF, as compared to the period before implementation of the 
ITF. 
 
 Table 2.2 
 Actual, Expectation, Inflation Target & Monetary Policy Credibility 
 
*) Credibility: the number of respondents that have a range of inflation expectations in inflation targeting monetary authority 
(Business Survey - BI, processed).  
 
Meanwhile, the Business Survey – BI (SKDU) with 2,000 companies as respondents 
shows that 51% of the companies anchor their inflation expectations on the target at the end of 
2009. This number has increased significantly as compared to around 24% in the early days of 
ITF implementation. If the results of the survey are used as a proxy for the degree of credibility 
                                                              
7 Technically, the Kalman Gain parameter captures a projection by economic agencies on an inflation target of 
monetary authorities in the Taylor rule equation through the derivation of Kalman filter. The Kalman gain parameter 
reflects the learning process of economic agents about the target inflation which the monetary authorities could use 
as a measure of the degree of credibility of monetary policy. The faster the learning process by the economic agents, 
about the inflation target of monetary authorities, the higher the degree of credibility of monetary policy. Kalman 
Gain value is between 0 and 1, where it is getting closer to a more credible monetary policy. 
8 The behaviour of economic agents that are more forward looking in inflation formation during the period of ITF 
implementation is in line with the findings due to Solikin (2004), Yanuarti (2007), and Alamsyah (2008). 
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of monetary policy, then the credibility has increased from approximately 0.24 to 0.51 in line 
with the consistent implementation of the ITF, see Table 2.2. 
 
2.3.2 Monetary Policy Credibility and Disinflation Process      
  
            Theoretically, the ITF aims to achieve a low and stable inflation
9. Although there is no 
agreement on how much the inflation target should actually be, the general long-term target level 
of inflation in developing and developed countries is around 2% - 3% (Roger and Stone, 2005). 
However, for developing countries, including Indonesia, inflation is quite far from this desired 
level of long-term inflation. The average inflation for developing countries implementing the ITF 
is  above  13%  (double  digit),  higher  than  the  developed  countries’  4%  (Fraga  et  al.,  2004). 
Obviously, this would lead to different disinflation strategies in the ITF era. Most developing 
countries usually set their inflation targets in the short-term time horizon, usually very early on in 
the implementation of annual targets in order to build the ITF and increase the credibility of 
monetary policy. 
 
Based  on  the  empirical  experience  of  many  countries,  there  are  several  strategies  to 
reduce inflation. In general, developed countries that have a low inflation level, (i.e. single digit) 
aggressively pursue a strategy of disinflation to reach a level-term inflation of about 2.0% - 
3.0%. Meanwhile, developing countries that have a fairly  high  level of  inflation (i.e. double 
digit) usually use a gradual disinflation strategy, targeting  the short-term inflation with a rate of 
decrease of about 0.8% per year before converging to the long-term inflation level of around 
2.0% - 3.0% (Roger and Stone, 2005)
10. 
 
The  Indonesian  case  shows  that  the  disinflation  process  conducted  by  the  monetary 
authorities would bring about a “sacrifice cost” in the form of declines in economic growth, 
given that monetary policy is not fully credible (Harmanta, 2009)
11.  Therefore, as monetary 
policy  is  not  fully  credible  in  Indonesia,  the  process  of  convergence  of  perceptions  or 
expectations of economic agents to the inflation target is slow and gradual
12. In light of this, the 
                                                              
9 Experience in several ITF countries shows that the inflation target set has the following characteristics: (i) quite 
low inflation, (ii) low inflation volatility, (iii) challenging efforts by the central bank, and (iv) could be achieved 
with a minimum loss of output. 
10 Some researchers show that the strategy is strongly influenced by the credibility of disinflation policies of central 
banks/monetary authorities. Developed countries are considered to have more credible monetary policies and tend to 
implement  an  aggressive  strategy  of  disinflation  because  their  monetary  policies  are  able  to  guide  inflation 
expectations of economic agents and actual inflation towards its target quickly. Hence, interest rate response would 
be  optimal  and  would  not  cause  a  large  loss  of  output.  While  monetary  policies  of  developing  countries  are 
considered less credible, the strategy of disinflation is likely to be applied gradually as monetary policy has not been 
able to fully guide inflation expectations. Response rates are therefore not optimal and may cause large loss of 
output. 
11 As shown by Ball (1994, 1995) and Roberts (1997), disinflation could be implemented without a significant 
sacrificial fee (costless) if inflation expectations are purely rational and monetary policy is fully credible (perfect 
credibility). 
12 In such a situation of a not fully credible monetary policy,  inflation expectations on actual inflation and the slow 
economic convergence of the inflation target, rapid disinflation would require a response in interest rates so high 
that it  could raise the cost in the form of high output loss. Consequently, to implement  a monetary policy that 
minimises the loss of social welfare, the central bank pursues a strategy of gradual disinflation. Economic agents 
look at actual inflation rather than the inflation target. By observing a gradual decline in inflation, expectations of 
economic agents would adjust only marginally against the inflation target. 17 
 
disinflation  strategy  in  Indonesia  during  the  period  2000  -  2008  tended  to  be  gradual,  at 
approximately -0.5% per year, slightly lower than average disinflation rate of other developing 
countries which is around -0.7% per year (Roger and Stone, 2005). 
 
The disinflation process in Indonesia has to be gradual due to imperfect credibility of 
monetary policy. An overly aggressive monetary policy to speed up the disinflation process may 
entail a high cost in terms of output loss and sacrifice ratio. In the context of a small open 
economy, the impact of a  rapid reduction in the inflation rate with imperfect credibility would  
put a lot of appreciation pressure on  the exchange rate, thus exacerbating the inflation-output 
trade off
13. Therefore, the strategy of gradual disinflation is taken in consideration of factors such 
as  high  prevailing  double-digit  inflation,  moderate  degree  of  persistence,  and  expectation 
behaviour that is backward-looking.  
 
                                                          Chart 2.4  
                                       Projection of Disinflation Process 
 
            With  this  strategy,  the  achievement of    the  long-term  inflation  target  in  Indonesia  is 
expected to take quite a while. Moreover, it is also highly influenced by the credibility progress 
of monetary policy itself and the dynamics of public learning. Related to this issue, an empirical 
study by Cukierman (2005) shows that one of the characteristics for the stabilisation of inflation 
from double digits to low single-digit inflation would be gradual disinflation. Experience from 
some countries, such as Chile  shows that the process of disinflation to low levels in the ITF 
would require more or less 36 quarters, or nearly 9 years (Schmidt-Hebbel and Werner, 2002). In 
fact, apart from Indonesia, there are still some developing countries implementing ITF with on-
                                                              
13 When monetary policy is not fully credible, the slow decline in interest rates could possibly generate a larger 
output loss. Monetary policy that is too tight would affect the behaviour of economic agents causing consumption to 
slow down. Furthermore, it affects the production side and output would decrease, impacting the Sacrifice Ratio. 
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going  disinflation  processes,  such  as  the  Philippines  (since  2002),  Colombia  (since  1999), 
Romania (since 2005), and Turkey (since 2006) (Roger, 2009). 
  
2.4   Various Measurement of Monetary Policy Credibility      
 
Implementation of monetary policy in an inflation targeting framework (ITF) cannot be 
separated from the inflation expectations of economic agents. In the setting of inflation targets by 
central  banks,  there  are  two  polar  possibilities  taken  by  economic  agents  in  terms  of 
“confidence”  or  “no  confidence”.  The  level  of  economic  agents’  confidence  is  an  abstract 
concept but it has high implications for the achievement of the inflation target. In other words, 
the level of confidence of economic agents is directly proportional to the level of central bank 
credibility. The higher the level of confidence of economic agents, the higher the credibility of 
monetary policy. Inflation expectations are therefore vital for anchoring the inflation target of 
monetary authorities. 
 
           Blinder (1999) defines credibility as  “words matching deeds”. Compatibility between 
words  and  actions  is  actually  the  core  of  credibility.  In  the    inflation-targeting  context,  an 
institution is considered credible if it  implements its monetary policy to achieve what has been 
explicitly  stated.  This  definition  is  similar  to  Svensson  (1999)  who  shows  that  a  credible 
monetary  policy  is  reflected  in  the  close  relationship  between  inflation  targets  and  inflation 
expectations  of  economic  agents,  as  against  policies  which  are  not  credible.  
Despite the varying general definitions, there are several options that can be considered in the 
technical measurement of credibility (credibility index). Given the qualitative characteristic, the 
level of credibility is generally defined in the form of a value in the range from 0 (not credible) 
to 1 (perfectly credible). 
  
         Valentin and Rozalia (2008) offers a method for measuring the credibility of monetary 
policy, formulated as follows: 
 
 
With πe being  inflation expectations of economic agents (private sector) and πtarget the central 
bank  inflation  target.  For  illustration,  in  terms  of  perfectly  successful  anchored  inflation 
expectations on the inflation target (eπ = target π), the equation above would provide  a valuable 
index for credibility or perfect credibility. Conversely, if inflation expectations are very high or 
higher than twice the inflation target, the credibility index would then be valued at 0 or is not 
credible  (no  credibility).  It  is  worth  mentioning  that  this  approach  imposes  “symmetric 
punishment”. 
 
As  an  alternative  measurement  of  the  credibility  of  monetary  policy,  Cecchetti  and 




With πe as inflation expectations of economic agents (private sector) and πtarget the central bank's 
inflation target.  If inflation expectations miss the upper bound of 20%, then the credibility index 
would be 0 automatically (not credible). Unlike previous measures, Cecchetti and Krause (2002) 
does  not  impose  symmetric  punishment  and  inflation  expectations  moving  in  sync  with  an 
inflation target represent a success for the central bank and therefore the credibility index value 
is 1 (perfect). 
  
          Credibility of the ITF  is crucial, particularly  for central  banks  in developing countries 
which are usually not independent from the influence of government or political establishments. 
This  credibility  can  also  be  developed    through  communication  and  transparency  to  further 
enhance  public  trust  and  inflation  expectations  on  the  inflation  target.  As  a  low  and  stable 
inflation rate is a prerequisite for sustained macroeconomic development, central banks have 
substantial flexibility in conducting monetary policy. Thus, the ITF framework is often described 
as “constrained discretion” (Bernanke and Mishkin, 1997). Constraint is manifested through high 
transparency and accountability of central banks, in order to generate credibility of monetary 
policies on the disinflation process and to reduce the problem of time-inconsistency. 
 
3.   Methodology & Model 
 
3.1   Model Structure and its Transmission Mechanism 
 
The  ARIMBI  with  Imperfect  Credibility  is  a  small  scale  model  of  the  quarterly 
macroeconomic model adopted from the Global Projection Model (GPM) of the IMF with the 
added feature of monetary policy credibility. However, because Indonesia does not have a good 
source for unemployment data, the unemployment rate equation is not included. This model is a 
gap model comprising the  main macroeconomic variables such as output, inflation, short-term 
interest rate, exchange rates and monetary policy credibility. The gap of each variable to the 
value of balance is the essence of the model. In addition, it also includes other variables and the 
complement of the identity equation. 
  
           Before further review of the equations in each model, we must first briefly explain the 
relationship  between  the  macroeconomic  variables  and  the  transmission  mechanism  of  the 
model. 
 
3.1.1 Model Structure 
 
The relationships  between the  variables  in the  ARIMBI with Imperfect Credibility  is 






Model Structure of ARIMBI with Imperfect Credibility 
 
 
            Diagram 3.1 above shows that there are four primary behavioral equations in the model, 
namely the inflation equation of the New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC), the output gap, 
uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) and the Taylor’s rule. The inflation equation, besides being 
influenced  by  forward-  and  backward-looking  inflation,  is  also  affected  by  the  output  gap, 
changes  in  oil  prices  and  real  exchange  rate.  The  output  gap  equation  is  affected  by  the 
backward- and  forward-looking  variable  itself, the real  interest rate, real exchange rates and 
external demand (captured by the US GDP). The Taylor’s Rule equation for determining the 
nominal policy interest rate is influenced by the real interest rate, deviations of inflation from 
target and output gap while the  UIP, which  is a deviation  between the expectations of the 
exchange rate and interest rate differentials are influenced by both domestic and foreign (rest of 
the world) factors. 
  
           One important assumption of the model is that the attainment of inflation targets with 
minimum cost is strongly influenced by the credibility of monetary policy. There are two ways to 
capture  the  dynamics  of  the  credibility  of  monetary  policy  in  a  model  and  these  are  the 
exogenous and endogenous factors. Modelling exogenous credibility of monetary policy assumes 
that the credibility of monetary policy moves to follow the auto regressive AR (1). Meanwhile, 
modelling the endogenous credibility of  monetary policy  is to assume that the credibility of 
monetary policy is in the nature of stock and would be increased or decreased in accordance with 
the past performance of the previous inflation target. In this case, the better the past performance, 
the more credible is monetary policy from the previous. In other words, increasing the credibility 
of monetary policy would cause inflation expectations to become closer to the inflation target, 
and the forecast of future inflation would get closer to the inflation target. Therefore, the higher 21 
 
the credibility of monetary policy, inflation expectations and actual inflation would be anchored 
sooner to the inflation target. 
  
3.1.2 Transmission Mechanism of Monetary Policy and Credibility  
  
           As  a  model  designed  to  support the  inflation  targeting  framework, the  ARIMBI  with 
Imperfect Credibility tracks the transmission mechanism of the BI rate as the monetary policy 
tool  to  achieve  the  inflation  target.  The  model  has  an  inflation  target  as  an  anchor.  If,  for 
example, there is a shock which affects the attainment of the target, the model can be used to 
simulate an appropriate monetary policy to drive inflation towards the target, in addition to the 
use of professional judgment. 
  
Interest rate as a monetary policy instrument  is expected to drive inflation towards the 
target via multiple transmission channels. Interest rates could affect inflation through the output 
gap and real exchange rate. The output gap could directly affect inflation via the existence of 
excess demand, while the real exchange rate could directly (direct pass-through) affect inflation 
via  imported  inflation.  Exchange  rates  could  also  indirectly  (indirect  passt-through)  impact 
inflation  through  the  output  gap  as  export  activities  increase  aggregate  demand.  
Meanwhile, as earlier stated, the transmission mechanism of monetary policy credibility depends 
on the  confidence of economic agents on monetary policy in achieving the inflation target.  
  
3.2   Data        
 
The model utilises eight variables, namely real GDP, CPI inflation, short-term interest 
rate, exchange rate, U.S. inflation, Fedfund rate, U.S. GDP and world oil prices (Minas). Before 
the filtering process to separate the variables and its gap and trend, the seasonal effects of  the 
variables are removed  by employing the X12 US Census Bureau. The filtering process generally 
comprises  the  HP  filter  method  with  some  adjustment  to the  level  and  trend  growth  in  the 
variable. 
  
            The data range used is 2000:Q1 to 2009:Q4. Indonesia does not utilise long historical 
data for several reasons -  before 1997, Indonesia implemented a fixed exchange rate regime and 
there  is a significant jump in the data due to economic crisis in the late1990s. 
  
3.3   Calibration Parameters 
 
           Behavioral parameters determine the dynamics of the model for long-term equilibrium or 
steady  state.  Behavioral  parameters  in  the  ARIMBI  model  use  the  parameter  calibration 
approach based on parameters in other models such as the BISMA of Bank Indonesia and other 
studies  on  countries  which  have  the  same  characteristics  of  the  Indonesian  economy.  The 











In  addition  to  behavioral  parameters,  there  are  steady-state  parameters  that  must  be 
included.  These  parameters  reflect  a  state  in  the  long  term  that  would  be  aimed  for.  The 
magnitude of these parameters is obtained based on historical average considerations of existing 
conditions  coupled with the Indonesian government’s  vision  for the  long term. Some of the 
steady-state parameters included in the model are presented in Table 3.2. 
 
Table 3.2 
 7 Steady-state Parameters 
No  Parameter  Description  Value % 
1  growth_ss  GDP Growth  7 
2  r_us_ss  US Real Interest Rate  0.5 
3  dz_ss  Real Exchange Rate Depreciation  -1.5 
4  prem_ss  Risk Premium  2.5 
5  pietar_ss  Inflation Target  3 
6  dcpi_us_ss  US Inflation  3 
7  cpiplus  Maximum Punishment on Inflation  0.5 
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  Assuming  a  steady-state  value  as  stated  above,  it  implies  that  the  steady-state  real 
interest rate is 1.5%, the nominal interest rate is 4.5%, U.S. nominal interest rate is 2.5% and the 
nominal  exchange  rate  appreciation  is  -0.5%.  In  other  words,  in  a  steady  state,  the  Rupiah 
(Indonesian currency) would appreciate by 0.5%. Cpiplus parameter  is a  new  feature  in this 
model that illustrates how much additional maximum inflation is added to the variable inflation 
expectations if the central bank has no credibility. Further discussions on this would be included 
in next section. 
  
3.4   Equations       
 
           The  ARIMBI  with  Imperfect  Credibility  has  several  advantages  in  that  it  provides 
reasonable fit, good theory model structure as well as it can be be used for forecasting and policy 
simulation (FPAS). The equations used in the model reflect the characteristics of the Indonesian 
economy. There are a number of key assumptions in the model. That Indonesia is a developing 
and open economy in comparison with the rest of the world (ROW), and is assumed not affecting 
ROW, but is instead affected by shocks that occur in the ROW.  
  
3.4.1 Main Equations  
 
            The trend variable is denoted by using alphabet letters with symbols line or bar on top, 
while the gap is denoted by using alphabet letters with symbols hat or cap on it. The annual rate 
year-on-year (y-o-y) variable is represented by four digits after the variable name, while the 
annual rate of quarterly (quarterly annualised) variable is denoted by four scoreless after the 
variable name, for example y-o-y CPI inflation is denoted by   . The growth variable is 
generally denoted by the letter d in front of a variable, e.g. GDP growth y-o-y denoted by  . 
  
            The gap is the difference between the variable and its potential value. The variable y is 
defined as 100 multiplied by the log of real GDP, y_bar as 100 multiplied by the log of output 
potential and y_hat as the output gap in percentage units, deriving  . The annual 
rate of quarterly inflation   is defined as 400 times the first difference of log CPI. While 
inflation y-o-y  is defined as 100 multiplied by the difference between inflation at this 
quarter and its previous four quarters. Several other important variables include  i  which is 
nominal interest rate, r  the real interest rate, s the  nominal exchange rate Rupiah per U.S. Dollar 
and z the log real exchange rate Rupiah compared to the U.S. Dollar. 
 
(i)  Main Equation 
 
Equations  (3.1)  to  (3.4)  are  the  main  behavioral  equations  which  describe  the 





            Equation (3.1) is a behavioral equation for the output against the value of its lag and lead 
(a measure of backward- and forward-looking), real interest rate gap, the real exchange rate gap, 
output gap in other countries, inflation in the real world oil prices and distrubance terms. 
 
           Equation (3.2)  is a New  Keynesian Phillips Curve equation to determine the  level of 
inflation, where inflation is described by past and future inflation, output gap, real exchange rate, 
and real world oil prices to the inflation disturbance term. The output gap is the variable that 
links the real side of economy with the inflation rate. The inflation rate is also influenced by 





              Equation (3.3) above is the Taylor’s rule equation used to determine the nominal value 
of short-term interest rates, which in this case can be interpreted as the Indonesian policy rate (BI 
Rate). The value of the interest rate is defined as a function of its lagged value (a smoothing 
device for capturing short-term rate changes) and the central bank’s response to changes in the 
deviation of the output gap between the expectations of inflation with the target inflation. In 
other words, Bank Indonesia seeks to achieve long-term equilibrium interest rate (which is the 
sum of the equilibrium real interest rates and one quarter ahead expectation inflation), where 
interest rates could also be adjusted in response to a deviation from expectations. The year-on-
year  inflation  rate  fourth  quarter  would  come  from  the  inflation  target,  ,  and 
against the current output gap. This equation also has disturbance term to accommodate the 




Equation (3.4) is the uncovered interest parity (UIP), which is the expected depreciation 
 equals to the nominal interest rate differential between the U.S and Indonesia. This 
calculation also includes the balance of risk premium, whereby if the interest rate in Indonesia is 
higher than US, there are one of two possibilities that could happen, or a combination of the two 
possibilities, namely whether the nominal exchange rate of Indonesia against the U.S. would 
experience a depreciation in the period Next (  higher than  ), or the nominal interest rate 
balance between Indonesia and the US is different because of the risk premium. A disturbance 
term is also included. 
 
          The expected nominal exchange rate is  weighted by the nominal forward exchange rate 
that would occur with the assumption of  perfect foresight, st+1 expectations, with its variable lag, 
st-1,  which  is  added  to  twice  the  trends  of  exchange  par  for  each  quarter, 




(ii) World Oil Price Equation 
 
World  oil  price  data  is  the  price  of  oil  that  comes  from  Minas  (USD/barrel). 
Incorporating world oil prices into the model requires several steps. Assuming that US inflation 




Then the filtering process is carried out by separate variables for trends and gaps in the real 




It is assumed that the growth trend of real world oil price is zero, so 
 
 
While in the real world oil price gap is modeled by an AR (1) 
 
 








(iii) Equation Variable Trend /Potential 
  
            For potential output variables, the shock is assumed to occur only in the growth rate of 
potential output. This shock causes a persistent deviation between potential output growth and 
value growth in the long-run steady-state it. 
 
 
Equation (3.12) states that the growth of potential output, in the long term is equal to the 
value growth of steady-state is, but could deviate from the growth of its steady state depending 
on the value of error, whether negative/ positive. Furthermore, it would return to the steady-state 
growth gradually, with a speed in accordance with its parameter values, whereby the greater the 
value, the faster potential output leads to the steady state. 
  
            For the target variables of inflation - the risk premium and real interest rates of U.S. 





Meanwhile,  for  the  variable  trend  of  real  interest  rates  and  trend  real  exchange  rate 




(iv)  Identity Equation 
  
           The identity equation is divided into three parts, namely the equation for calculating an 




Or the equation that represents the identity of the filtering process to separate the trends and gaps 




The last is the equation of identity that reflects the relationship that comes from such a simple 
economic  theory:  equation  (3.30)  and  (3.31)  define  the  real  interest  rate  as  the  difference 
between the nominal interest rate and CPI inflation expectations at a subsequent quarter. 
   
 
Equation (3.32) is the relationship of real exchange rate, zt  at the rate of nominal, st   which is 
defined as the Indonesian currency (Rupiah) as compared to the U.S. Dollar, added to the CPI 27 
 
  in the US, less the CPI, Indonesia  . An increase in the value zt, denotes a real 
depreciation in Indonesian Rupiah against the US dollar. 
 
 
(v) Equation Rest of the World 
  
           With the assumption that the Indonesian economy is a relatively small open economy, the 




3.4.2 Credibility Equations  
  
           The new features of this model are the credibility variables. These include 1-INCREDt , so 
variables that are explicitly used is variable INCREDt or a variable that represents credibility of  
the  central  bank.  INCREDt    that  has  a  value    one  (1)  denotes that the  central  bank  has  no 
credibility at all, while a  INCREDt value of 0 denotes full credibility. 
 
In principle, adding credibility is done by changing the inflation expectations variable 
with perfect foresight previously assumed to be variable for inflation expectations. The 
equation  contains  elements  of  penalties  depending  on  the  credibility  of  central  banks,  or  is 
written as: 
 
   
 
Where, as previously described, the parameter cpiplus illustrates how much additional maximum 
inflation is added to the inflation expectations variable if the central bank has no credibility. For 
example, if the central bank has no credibility at all, it would mean that the variable INCREDt 
has  a  value  of  one  while  the  value  of  cpiplus  would  be  0.5,  meaning  that  the  inflation 
expectations is 0.5% higher than inflation expectations with perfect foresight.  
 
           In this paper, we model two types of credibility, namely exogenous and endogenous. The 
ARIMBI with exogenous credibility simply feeds the variable INCREDt into the AR (1) towards 
the value of steady state of zero, or in other words, assumed credibility would be increased from 




Meanwhile, the model with endogenous credibility adds the past performance of the attainment 





In endogenous approach, we try to incorporate credibility which does not always increase from 
time to time, but depends on the past performance. 
  
3.5   Measurement of Monetary Policy Credibility        
  
            In the  development  and usage of the  ARIMBI with Imperfect Credibility, we need to 
know the value of central bank credibility under current conditions as an initial value. From the 
perspective of forecasting, the credibility value is entered as the initial value at the time when 
data  with  the  actual  date  is  available.  For  example,  if  forecasting  begins  in  2009:Q2,  the 
credibility indices that are to be used would be the initial value in 2009:Q1.  
 
           The  credibility  index  measurement  of  Bank  Indonesia  uses  the  two  approaches  of 
Valentin and Rozalia (VR, 2008) and Cecchetti and Krause (CK, 2002). The inflation target uses 
annual data 2002-2009 of both the targets set by BI as well as by the government with input from 
the central bank. Inflation expectations use three sets data, namely: Business Survey (Survey 
SKDU BI), Consensus Forecast (CF) and Actual Inflation. Therefore, six BI credibility indices 
can be derived as a result. Previous research (Harmanta, 2009) using the Bayesian estimation of 
DSGE models of small open economy  for the data period 2000-2008 produced an index figure 
of 0.4. Generally, it is believed that the current monetary policy credibility of Bank Indonesia is 
not  completely  perfect  (imperfect  credibility).  However,  in  the  long  term,  coupled  with  the 
communication and transparency as well as policy consistency of Bank Indonesia, the credibility 
of monetary policy is expected to increase slowly but surely. 
 
4.   Results and Analysis 
 
4.1   Initial Credibility Index        
  
           As already mentioned above, the index measuring the credibility of monetary policy is 
modelled after VR 2008 and CK 2002. For the measurement of CK 2002, loose adjustments of 
20%-15%  are  made  over  the  previous  limit.  This  is  in  consideration  that  Indonesia  is  a 
developing  country  and  its  business  environment  is  relatively  more  uncertain  compared  to 
developed  countries.  Based  on  the  historical  data  of  Indonesia,  the  highest  CPI  (y-o-y)  in 
Indonesia was 17.11% in 2005 but has never reached 20%.  
 
           Using expectations data (Survey SKDU BI, Consensus Forecast and Actual Inflation), we 
obtained the values  for BI’s Credibility Index BI as follows :  
 
   Table 4.1  
  Initial Credibility Index 




1  Survey SKDU- BI 
  0.604 
  0.664 
 
2  Consensus Forecast 
  0.789 
  0.841 
 
3  Actual Inflation 
  0.581 





Table 4.1 above  shows that  how different  inflation expectations data and measurement 
indices  produces  different  results,  ranging  from  0.581  till  0.841.  The  results  show  that  the 
credibility of monetary policy  in Indonesia during the period 2000 - 2009 is not completely 
perfect (imperfect credibility). Based on these results and taking into account other previous 
results  (such  as  Harmanta  (2009)  which    showed  0.41  and  0.51  number  of  companies  that 
inflation expectations anchored to the target),  for  the next section we use a conservative value 
of 0.50 as the initial credibility value.   
  
4.2   Assumption of Steady-state Variables              
 
            Several important assumptions and conditions in simulation and forecasting for aggregate 
macroeconomic variables in the study are taken as follows: 
 
•  Long-term inflation target to be achieved with the implementation of the ITF in Indonesia 
amounting to 3% + 1% (see, for example,  Monetary Policy Report of Bank Indonesia). 
 
•  Medium-term inflation target of Indonesia up to 2014-2015 of 4.0% (plus minus 1%), in line 
with the economic recovery process in order to achieve an economic growth of about 7.0 % - 
7.5% in the year 2014-2015, as targeted by government. 
 
•  In line with the measurement of the credibility of monetary policy as mentioned earlier (based 
on the measurement method of Cecchetti and Krause (2002), the SKDU Survey results and 
some  results  of  previous  studies  (Harmanta,  2009),  the  initial  value  of  the  credibility  of 
monetary policy is about 0.5. 
 
•  To  gauge  the  impact  of  monetary  policy  credibility  on  the  dynamics  of  macroeconomic 
variables, especially on the medium-term inflation target length with minimal cost, there are 
three scenarios of monetary policy credibility, namely: (i) the credibility of the baseline with 
the initial value of 0.5, (ii) less credible with initial value of 0.1, and (iii) more credible with 
the initial value of 0.9. 
 
•  Disinflation  strategy  for  achieving  low  and  stable  inflation:  (i)  the  long  disinflation  time 
required to reach the target medium-and long-term inflation, and (ii) the cost of disinflation: 
Sacrifice Ratio, i.e. the output loss that occurs for each decline in inflation by 1%. 
  
          The simulation results of policies and projections in this study are as follows: 
  
4.3   Simulation Results of Exogenous Credibility    
  
            The simulation results and projections of macro variables with some degree of exogenous 







Simulation Results of Exogenous Credibility 
   
   
   
     
   Based on the chart above, the baseline scenario, with the assumption of monetary policy 
credibility with the initial value of 0.5 and considering the existence of inflationary pressures 
beginning in Quarter-10 (Q-10),  the nearing of  the upper limit of the inflation target in line with 
global and domestic economic recovery, interest rates (the optimum Taylor’s rule based on the 
endogenous ARIMBI), needs to be raised starting in Q-8 and gradually lowered beginning in Q-
12. On the one hand, the path of inflation is likely to be anchored  to 4.0% + 1% in Q-24. 
However, on the other hand, the path of interest rates would lead to an economic growth about 
5.5% to 6.4% in next few quarters before going to achieve 7.0 - 7.5% in Q-24. In line with the 
path  of  interest  rate  and  the  trajectory  of  inflation  and  GDP,  exchange  rates  would  slightly 
appreciate before  staying steady at Rp. 9300-9750/USD in the medium and long term. 
  
           In the less credible scenario, with the initial assumption of lower credibility value of 0.1, 
the path of inflation is higher than the baseline - inflation in Q-9 to Q-12 would approach the 
upper limit of the target. Hence, inflation starting  in Q-13 would pass through the upper limit of 
the inflation target. Considering the existence of higher inflationary pressure compared to the 
baseline, the central bank should raise  interest rates higher that those of the baseline to achieve 
the medium-term inflation target of 4% (plus minus 1%) in Q-24. The path to higher interest 31 
 
rates would lead to lower economic growth compared to the baseline to about 5.5% to 6.2 % up 
to Q-12. For the overall cost of disinflation, the scenario of less credible monetary policy would 
result in the Sacrifice Ratio (output loss that occurs for the decline in inflation of 1%) being 
higher than the baseline. In the medium to long  term, the less credible scenario also causes the 
trajectory to weaken the exchange rate as compared to the baseline. 
  
           For  the more credible scenario which assumes a higher initial credibility value of 0.9, the 
path of inflation is lower than the baseline where inflation moves closer to the midpoint or the 
lower limit of the inflation target. Considering that the trajectory of inflation is lower than the 
baseline and has been anchored relative to the inflation target, the current interest rate could be 
maintained until Q7, before being lowered gradually. The path to lower interest rates would lead 
to higher economic growth compared to the baseline, to about 5 – 6 % in next few quarters. From 
the perspective  of disinflation cost, the scenario of a more credible monetary policy would cause 
the Sacrifice Ratio (output loss that occurs for the decline in inflation of 1%) to be lower than the 
baseline. In the medium to long term, a more credible scenario would cause the trajectory to  
further strengthen the exchange rate compared to baseline. 
 
4.4   Simulation Results of Endogenous Credibility    
 
Chart 4.2 
Simulation Results of Endogenous Credibility 







In the baseline scenario with the initial assumption of 0.5, considering the credibility of 
inflation pressure from Q-10 which approximates the upper limit of the inflation target, interest 
rates (optimum based on the Taylor’s rule in ARIMBI endogenous) need to be raised gradually 
from Q-6 and  lowered gradually beginning in Q-11. With this interest rate path, the inflation 
target of  4.0% is likely to be achieved in the medium term. This interest rate path would also 
bolster economic growth to around 5.5% to 6.2% in next few quarters before achieving a steady  
economic growth of around 7.0% - 7.5%. In line with the path of interest rate and the trajectory 
of inflation and GDP, exchange rates would be stronger (appreciation) at  around Rp. 9150-9550/ 
USD. 
  
          In the less credible scenario, with the initial assumption of credibility of 0.1, the trajectory 
of inflation is higher than the baseline where inflation in the year 2011 would approach the upper 
limit of the inflation target. Considering the existence of higher inflationary pressure compared 
to baseline, the central bank should raise interest rates more than the baseline to achieve the 
inflation medium to term  target of 4%. However, the path to higher interest rates would lead to 
lower economic growth compared to the baseline. From the cost of disinflation perspective, the 
less credible scenario would cause the Sacrifice Ratio (output loss that occurs from the decline in 
inflation of 1%) to be higher than the baseline. In the medium to long term, the less credible 
scenario also causes the trajectory to weaken the exchange rate compared to the baseline. 
  
          For the more credible scenario, the credibility index is assumed at 0.9. The trajectory for 
inflation is lower than the baseline - moving closer to the midpoint or lower limit of the inflation 
target. Considering the lower inflation trajectory than the baseline and relative  anchoring  to the 
inflation target, the current interest rate could be maintained up to Q-7, before being lowered 
gradually. Obviously, the path to lower interest rates would lead also to higher economic growth 
compared to the baseline (around 5.5 % to 6.5% in next few quarters). From the disinflation cost 
perspective, the more credible scenario would result in a lower Sacrifice Ratio (output loss that 
occurs for a decline in inflation of 1%) than the baseline. In the medium to long term, the more 
credible scenario would strengthen the exchange rate compared to baseline. 
  
4.5   Simulation Results : Comparison of Baseline and Late Scenario       
 
           To analyse whether the timing of interest rate policy response affects the dynamics of the 
key macroeconomic variables, we simulate a late response rate (Late Scenario) compared to the  

















   
   
 
 
In the late scenario, with the assumption that monetary policy credibility of the initial 
value is equal to the baseline of 0.5, any delay in the hike of the policy response rate would cause 
the trajectory of inflation to be higher than the baseline. As we can see from Chart 4.3, inflation 
is near the upper limit of the inflation target up to the next eight quarters and pass the upper limit 
of the inflation target starting in Q-9. In order to achieve the medium-term inflation target (4% in 
Q-24) and considering  that the inflation trajectory is higher than the baseline, interest rates need 
to be raised  higher than the  baseline  before they can  be reduced gradually  from Q-16. This 
higher interest rates path would affect medium-term economic growth which is lower than the 
baseline. In terms of the cost of disinflation, the late scenario would yield a higher Sacrifice 
Ratio (output loss that occurs for a decline in inflation of 1%) than the baseline, especially in the 
medium term. Therefore, in the medium to long term, the slow response of monetary policy 
would lead to a path of a weaker exchange rate compared to the baseline. 
  
            Based on the above simulation results, this study shows that the delay in the response rate 34 
 
would  result in a higher inflation path and could even exceed the inflation target. Consequently, 
bringing  down  inflation  back  to  the  path  of  the  target  necessitates  very  high  interest  rates. 
Obviously, this in turn would slow economic growth. The trade off between inflation and higher 
output has the impact of increasing the Sacrifice Ratio, thus for every endeavor to decrease the 
inflation, a higher output loss is required. An implication of these findings is that Bank Indonesia 
would  need  to  maintain  timely  consistency  in  responding  to  inflationary  pressures  with  the 
optimum level of interest rates. Therefore, any delay in the monetary policy resonse could have 
an impact on the cost of disinflation. 
 
4.6   Periods for Disinflation Process  
 
           In terms of the time frame of disinflation, Table 4.8 presents the simulation and projection 
length of disinflation for the medium-term target (4%) and long-term target (3%).  
 
Table 4.8  
Periods for Disinflation Process 
Credibility Type   Periods for Disinflation Process 
Medium Term (4%)   Long Term (3%) 
Exogen  
Initial cred = 0.1 
Initial cred = 0.5 










Initial cred = 0.1 
Initial cred = 0.5 









     
 
Table 4.8 shows that the period  length of disinflation for anchoring to the medium-term 
inflation target which is strongly influenced by the degree of monetary policy credibility. The 
scenario with the initial baseline monetary policy credibility value of 0.5, either exogenous or 
endogenous, takes less than 19 quarters to reach an inflation of 4% in the medium term. If the 
initial value of credibility  is decreased to 0.1, the process of disinflation to the  4% medium-term 
target  requires  a  longer  period  of  25  quarters  (exogenous)  or  31  quarters  (endogenous). 
Conversely, if the initial value is increased to 0.9, the  process of disinflation to the medium-term 
target  only  requires  a  time  period  of  11  quarters  (exogenous)  or  25  quarters  (endogenous). 
Similarly, disinflation to reach the 3% long-term target requires a time frame of 22-24 quarters if 
the credibility of the initial value is 0.9. In a less credible situation (index set to 0.1), it would 
take  a  longer  time  of  48  quarters (exogenous) or  64  quarter  (endogenous).  For the  baseline 
credibility  of  0.5,  it  would  require  40  quarters  (exogenous)  or  56  quarters  (endogenous)  to 
achieve long-term inflation target of 3%. 
  
             Comparing the endogenous and exogenous approaches, it is clear that the exogenous 
monetary policy credibility method, while simpler, yields less realistic results. This is because 
exogenous credibility cannot fully capture the reward - punishment factor in the attainment of the 
inflation targets. In contrast, the modeling of endogenous monetary policy credibility while more 35 
 
complex,  provides more realistic results. It has been argued that endogenous credibility is better 
able to capture the reward-punishment aspect of inflation target attainment  with the inclusion of  
the specific deviation of inflation to the inflation target. For example, the greater the endogenous 
credibility of monetary policy, the smaller the deviations of inflation from its target, thus there 
are rewards for the shorter length of disinflation to 3% in contrast to the exogenous approach. 
Conversely, the smaller the endogenous credibility, the higher the deviations of inflation from its 
target and thus  punishments for the longer  disinflation length to reach the target of  3%. This 
finding is briefly summarised in the following matrix: 
 
Table 4.9  
Comparative Matrix of Exogenous & Endogenous Credibility  
 Items  Exogen  Endogen 
Simple   V  - 
Better Punishment-Reward Mechanism  -  V 
 
Based  on  projected  results  and  simulation  of  monetary  policy  credibility,  this  study 
specifically shows that:  
 
•  Inflation expectations of economic agents are strongly influenced by central bank monetary 
policy credibility. The more credible the monetary policy, the faster inflation expectations are 
anchored  to  the  inflation  target  and  thus  a  greater  chance  that  actual  inflation  would  be 
anchored to the target. This in turn would accelerate the disinflation process towards low and 
stable inflation in the medium to long term. 
 
•  Disinflation  costs  are  greatly  influenced  by  central  bank  monetary  policy  credibility.  The 
more credible the monetary policy, the lower the cost of disinflation (reflected in the Sacrifice 
Ratio) to achieve low and stable inflation in the medium to long term. This, in turn, would 
minimise the trade off of output-inflation. 
 
•  Better controlled inflation at a low and stable level would provide conducive conditions for 
sustainable economic growth and less volatile exchange rate. 
 
•  Slower response of  monetary policy  in comparison to baseline   optimum  conditions  may 
result in trending towards higher inflation,  leading  to longer time  frames, higher interest 
rates and disinflation costs  for the attainment of the inflation target. 
 
5.   Conclusions and Policy Implications  
 
•  The  ARIMBI with Imperfect Credibility  is theoretically coherent with reasonable  fit. The 
required data is available and it can be used for forecasting and policy simulation (FPAS). 
 
•  The  results  of  the  model  indicate  that  monetary  policy  in  Indonesia  is  not  fully  credible 
(imperfect credibility) with a value of approximately 0.5 (a scale of 0 of no credibility and 
scale of 1 of perfect credibility).  
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•  The projection and simulation results show that the disinflation to the target of low and stable 
inflation in Indonesia is influenced by the credibility of monetary policy. The more credible 
the monetary policy, the faster the disinflation process towards the target. In addition, the 
endogenous  approach  of  monetary  policy  credibility  is  more  realistic  than  the  exogenous 
approach. 
 
•  The projection and  simulation results also show that the disinflation  cost of attaining the 
inflation target, measured as the Sacrifice Ratio, is strongly influenced by the monetary policy 
credibility. The more credible the monetary policy, the smaller the Sacrifice Ratio, meaning 
that the efforts to decrease inflation would not result in large output loss. The implication is 
that a central bank would face a smaller trade-off between stabilising inflation and stabilising 
output. 
 
•  The slow response of monetary policy in comparison to baseline  optimum conditions would 
result in a higher inflation path, leading  to longer time  frames, higher interest rates and 
disinflation costs  for the attainment of the inflation target. 
 
•  In terms of strategies for achieving the inflation  target in Indonesia, the results show that as 
monetary policy conditions are not fully credible (imperfect credibility), the central bank has 
to  implement  a  gradual    disinflation  process.  A  rapid  process  to  the  target  would  have 
implications on interest rate increases, possibly resulting in very large fluctuations in output 
and the exchange rate. 
 
•  The research shows that inflation expectations are greatly  influenced by the credibility of 
monetary policy. The implication is that the management of inflation expectations while very 
important  remains  challenging.  The  central  bank  needs  to  consistently  demonstrate  its 
commitment to attain the inflation target. 
 
•  The simulation results support the mandate of the Bank Indonesia Act No.23 of 1999 and 
No.3 of 2004 requiring Bank Indonesia to publicly announce the inflation target and inflation 
as  the  overriding  objective  of  monetary  policy  through  the  implementation  of  inflation 
targeting  framework  (ITF).  The  implementation  of  the  ITF  is  an  effort  to  enhance  the 
credibility of monetary policy through the transparent commitment of achieving the inflation 
target in order for the expectation of economic agents to feedback realistically to the goal of 
the inflation target and disinflation programme. 
 
•  Related to the limitations and further research opportunities, the dynamics of the credibility of 
monetary policy is modelled in a linear fashion. Looking ahead, non-linear credibility would 
be challenging but very useful as it may capture effects of punishment-reward in a better and 
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